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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of open disagreement on motivation and coordination.
It shows how – in the presence of differing priors – motivation and coordination impose
conflicting demands on the allocation of authority, leading to a trade-off between the
two.
The paper first derives a new mechanism for delegation: since the agent thinks – by
revealed preference applied to differing priors – that his own decisions are better than
those of the principal, delegation will motivate him to exert more effort when effort
and correct decisions are complements. A need for implementation effort will thus lead
to more decentralization. The opposite holds for substitutes.
Delegation, however, reduces coordination when people disagree on the right course
of action. The paper shows that – with differing priors – the firm needs to rely more
on authority (as opposed to incentives) to solve coordination problems, relative to the
case with private benefits. An interesting side-result here is that the principal will
actively enforce her decisions only at intermediate levels of the need for coordination.
The combination of the two main results implies a trade-off between motivation
and coordination, both on a firm level and across firms. I derive the motivation-
coordination possibility frontier and show the equilibrium distribution of effort versus
coordination. I finally argue that strong culture, in the sense of homogeneity, is one
(costly) way to relax the trade-off.
JEL Codes: D8, L2, M5
Keywords: delegation, motivation, coordination, authority, differing priors, heterogeneous priors
1 Introduction
Motivation and coordination are two of the most central concerns in organization design.
In particular, once people join hands in an organization, their actions must be coordinated
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extensive conversations and feedback, and also to Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts for inspiration and
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to realize the benefits of organization, while they must also get motivated since they do
not bear the full consequences of their actions any more (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). To
a large extent, the problem of organization is to capture the benefits of specialization and
scale while minimizing the motivation and coordination losses. In practice, this often leads
to a trade-off between motivation and coordination. In fact, many of the key choices in
organization design can be framed in terms of that trade-off.
This paper studies the interaction between, on the one hand, differing priors about the
right course of action, and, on the other hand, motivation and coordination. In particular,
the paper shows that – in the presence of differing priors – motivation and coordination
impose conflicting demands on the allocation of authority, which causes a trade-off between
the two.
To study these issues, I consider the setting of a manager-entrepreneur who undertakes
a project and who needs to employ an agent to realize that project. In the context of this
project, both the principal and the agent will need to make a decision, and the agent also
needs to exert effort to execute his decision. The project’s success depends on the quality
of the decisions; on the coordination between the decisions; and on the effort exerted by the
employee. The principal can contract with the agent on the outcome of the project, and
chooses to either control the agent’s decision or to delegate that decision to the agent.
The paper first derives a new rationale for delegation (when people may openly disagree
on the right course of action). The starting point is the observation that – by revealed
preference applied to differing priors – the agent believes that his own choices and decisions
are better than these imposed by his principal. As a consequence, if effort is a complement1
to making good decisions, then the agent will expect a higher return from his effort – and
thus exert more effort – when he can make the decision himself. In other words, delegation
will increase the agent’s effort or motivation. An important example of such effort that is
a complement to correct decisions, is ‘implementation effort’ (i.e., effort to implement and
execute a decision). The opposite result also holds: when effort is a substitute to correct
decisions then delegation will decrease the agent’s effort. Since complementary effort seems
to be the more likely of the two – as I discuss later – the key prediction here is that a need
for implementation effort will favor delegation. I also argue that this result does not hold in
a common prior/private information setting.
Delegation, however, reduces coordination when people disagree on the right course of
action since each player will want to follow the course of action that he considers best. The
key result here is that with differing priors we typically need to rely more on authority
(relative to incentives) to solve coordination problems. In particular, while coordination
problems that originate in private benefits may be mitigated or even eliminated through
an appropriate allocation of residual income, this approach is less (if at all) effective when
the coordination problem comes from differing priors. The reason is that – in the case of
differing priors – shifting residual income to a player not only makes him internalize more of
his externalities, but also increases his incentives to just do what he thinks is right. These
1Effort is a complement to a decision if effort is more useful when the decision is correct than when the
decision is wrong (and vice versa for being a substitute). I discuss these concepts and their implications in
section 3 and appendix B.
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two forces often go in opposite directions. In particular, in the model of this paper, the
two effects exactly cancel each other out so that incentives are completely ineffective to get
coordination. For an analogous model with private benefits, on the other hand, I do show
that incentives can solve the coordination problem. More broadly, this result suggests that
incentives are less effective to solve externalities when these externalities originate in differing
priors.
An interesting – though less important – result is that the principal will actively enforce
her decisions only when the importance of coordination is intermediate. The reason is that
coordination being more important also gives the players reasons to try to coordinate on
their own initiative, and thus makes active enforcement of centralized coordination decisions
less necessary.
Combining these results leads to the final conclusion that disagreement induces a trade-
off between coordination and motivation. I first show that – for exogenously given levels
of incentives – firms face a trade-off between motivation and coordination, and derive the
effort-coordination possibility frontier (Roberts 2004).2 I further show how the trade-off
manifests itself in a cross-section of firms. I finally argue that strong culture, in the sense of
shared beliefs (Schein 1985, Van den Steen 2005a), may relax the trade-off (although it also
comes at a cost).
Literature There are two other papers (in the economics literature) that deal, directly
or indirectly, with the motivation-coordination trade-off: Athey and Roberts (2001) and
Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2005).3 I will discuss these papers in detail in section 7,
at which point it will be easier to compare the different mechanisms. As I will show there,
the papers differ substantially from the current one, both in mechanism and in empirical
predictions.
In the organization behavior literature, elements of this trade-off can already be found
in Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). Not long after that important publication, however, the
field of organization behavior shifted its focus from these structure/design issues towards
more ‘behavioral’ issues such as social networks, influence, or emotion. One unfortunate
consequence is that there is – to my knowledge – no relevant empirical work that studies the
coordination-motivation trade-off.
The delegation/motivation effect is also related to the economic literature on delegation,
in particular to Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Za´bojn´ık (2002). I discuss the difference with
2Roberts (2004) gives an informal discussion of this concept. The frontier indicates for a given level of
resources spent (on motivation and coordination) how much motivation we can get for a desired level of
coordination. A downward-sloping frontier implies a trade-off between motivation and coordination. He
illustrates how this concept explains some important organizational changes and some implications for the
‘markets-firms’ trade-off.
3Friebel and Raith (2006) is also indirectly related. They study optimal horizontal integration when such
integration enables resource allocation across the different activities. Within an integrated firm, the issues
are similar to Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2005): to allocate resource optimally, the manager needs
to extract information from the division managers, but doing so requires balanced incentives which conflict
with the focused incentives that are required for optimal effort. In their model, however, coordination plays
no role.
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these papers – such as the empirical predictions on substitutes versus complements or the
role that delegation plays – in detail in section 3.4
Finally, as I will discuss in section 6, two papers that are closely related to the current one
also have implications for the motivation-coordination tradeoff. The first is Van den Steen
(2005b), which shows that for a principal to have interpersonal authority over an agent,
it may be necessary to minimize the agent’s pay-for-performance and other outcome-based
incentives. The second is Van den Steen (2006), which studies the optimal allocation of
control under differing priors (in the absence of coordination and incentive considerations).
The delegation result also implicitly uses the endogenous overoptimism result of Van den
Steen (2004b).
Contribution The contribution of this paper is threefold. It derives a new rationale for
delegation, it shows that coordination problems that emerge from disagreement have to be
solved with authority rather than incentives, and it shows that the combination of these
two effects forces a trade-off between motivation and coordination. The observation that
enforcement of centralized decisions may be non-monotone in the importance of coordination,
is an interesting side-result.
The next section introduces the model. Sections 3 and 4 derive the motivation effect and
coordination effect in partial equilibrium (with the agent’s incentives exogenously given).
Section 5 combines these results and endogenizes incentives, thus deriving the motivation-
coordination trade-off. Section 6 discusses other effects and potential solutions to the trade-
off, section 7 compares to other papers, while section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
The model in this paper captures the common organizational setting in which employees must
make decisions and exert effort to make a particular project succeed but, at the same time,
the actions of different agents and of the principal need to be coordinated. A key question
will then be whether the principal chooses to control the agent’s decisions or, instead, prefers
to delegate them to the agent, and how that affects the agent’s choice of effort.
Formally, consider a principal P who employs an agent A for a project. As part of the
project, A and P each will make a decision, denoted respectively DA and DP , from the set
{X, Y }. Moreover, A also chooses whether to exert effort to execute his decision, i.e., he
chooses e ∈ {0, 1}. Depending on all these actions, the project will ultimately either succeed
or fail, generating an income of respectively 1 or 0. As mentioned earlier, the probability of
success will, in particular, depend on 3 factors that I discuss now: the correctness of each
player’s decision; whether the decisions are coordinated; and whether A exerted effort. First,
a player’s decision will be correct if and only if it fits the state of the world S ∈ {x, y}. That
4Other papers on topics that are more indirectly related are Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999), Dessein
(2002), Hart and Holmstrom (2002), Prendergast (2002) Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (2004), Marino and
Matsusaka (2004), and Marino, Matsusaka, and Za´bojn´ık (2006). None of these papers, however, deal with
the specific issues that are central to this paper.
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state of the world is unknown, however, and each player i has his or her own subjective
belief µi that the state is x. The players have differing priors, i.e., µA and µP may differ
even though no player has private information about the state.5 I will discuss below how
these beliefs get determined. Second, the players’ decisions are coordinated if and only if
DA = DP . Third, the agent’s effort is a binary choice e ∈ {0, 1} that imposes some private
cost of effort on the agent A, as discussed below.
To specify the project’s probability of success formally, let di = IDi=S be the indicator
function that the decision of person i is correct; C = IDA=DP the indicator function that the
two decisions are identical (‘Coordinated’); and e the indicator function whether the agent
exerted effort. The probability of success Π of the project is then as follows:
Π = dA + dP − βccc(1− C)− βe(1− e)dA
with βe, βc ≥ 0 and βe + βc ≤ 1. This function is a weighted sum of three terms, with βc
and βe denoting the relative weights. The first term, dA + dP , is the basic payoff and simply
depends on whether the respective decisions are correct or not. The second term, −cc(1−C),
captures the effect of coordination. If both players choose the same decision, then C = 1
and this term vanishes. If not, then the term imposes a ‘coordination cost’ cc.6 The third
term captures the effect of effort. If the agent exerts effort (e = 1), then this third term
again vanishes, but if the agent does not exert effort then this term imposes a cost. As I
will discuss later, the agent’s effort is, in this specification, complementary to the decision
being correct. The agent’s private cost of effort will be βec2e/2. The reason for scaling the
effort cost by βe is that I want βe to capture the importance of the effort component, without
changing the cost-benefit of effort in itself.
The timing of the game, indicated in figure 1, is as follows. The principal first contracts
with the agent on the outcome of the project. In particular, P offers A a wage w and a share
α of the project revenue upon success. A accepts or rejects the offer, where rejection ends
the game immediately. Furthermore, A is protected by limited liability and has an outside
wage equal to zero. This will imply that in equilibrium w = 0. Once the players have
contracted, ce ∼ U [0, 1], cc ∼ U [0, 1], and the µi are realized. The idea of having the costs
and beliefs being drawn after the contract negotiation is that the contentious issues arise
only after the project has been started, so that it is only at that time that it becomes clear
which issues and thus which costs and beliefs are relevant.7 To keep the analysis transparent
and tractable, I assume a very simple degenerate and independent distribution for the prior
5For a more extensive discussion of differing priors, see Morris (1995). Some papers by other authors that
have used differing priors include Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1994), Yildiz (2003), or Boot, Gopalan,
and Thakor (2006). Differing priors do not contradict the economic paradigm: while rational agents should
use Bayes’ rule to update their prior with new information, nothing is said about those priors themselves,
which are primitives of the model. In particular, absent any relevant information, agents have no rational
basis to agree on a prior. Harsanyi (1968) observed that ‘by the very nature of subjective probabilities, even
if two individuals have exactly the same information and are at exactly the same high level of intelligence,
they may very well assign different subjective probabilities to the very same events’.
6As will become clear below, cc is a random variable. I also include βc to transparently parameterize the
importance of coordination.
7We could formalize this by assuming that there are many potential issues on which the players may
disagree. Both players’ beliefs on each of the issues are known, but it is revealed only at the end of period 1
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1Contracting
a P offers A a contract (w,α).
b A accepts or rejects. Upon
rejection, the game is over
and both get 0.
c The costs ce and cc get drawn
publicly.
d The beliefs µi get drawn pri-
vately.
2
Actions
a P has the option to decide
DP and/or DA.
b Player i decides Di (if Di is
undecided) and A chooses
e ∈ {0, 1}.
3
Payoff
a Project payoffs and costs
are realized.
b Contract terms (w,α) are
executed.
Figure 1: Time line of the model
beliefs. In particular, for some given parameters νA, νP ∈ (.5, 1), µi will equal either νi or
1− νi, with equal probability. In other words, µi is drawn from a 2-point distribution with
half its weight on νi and half on 1− νi. It follows that each player will believe half the time
that x is the most likely state, and half the time that y is the most likely state. Since the
prior beliefs are independent draws, the players will agree only half the time, and disagree
the other half. Moreover, each player always has the same confidence, νi, in the state that
he considers most likely. These belief realizations are private information. In period 2a, the
principal has the option to make any decisions she likes. If she does not decide DA then
she automatically delegates that decision to the agent. In period 2b, each player makes his
decision if it wasn’t made yet, and the agent also chooses his effort. The choices in period 2
are all public. In period 3, finally, the payoffs get realized and the contract is executed. The
principal’s utility is then uP = (1−α)Π−w and the agent’s utility is uA = αΠ+w−βec2e/2.
In case of multiple equilibria, the players select the Pareto-dominant one, if one exists.
In what follows, I do the analysis in two steps. First, in sections 3 and 4, I consider
motivation and coordination – separately – in the subgame starting in period 2, i.e., taking
w, α, cc, ce, and the belief realizations as exogenously given. This case with (α, w) given
builds intuition for the final result but is also important in its own right. In particular,
in many instances the contract (α, w) is longer-term or determined by other factors, while
the delegation and coordination decisions are part of daily decision making. In that case,
this partial analysis is the right approach to derive empirical predictions. In section 5, I
endogenize the contract and derive the full equilibrium and the trade-off.
3 Motivation and Delegation in Subgame Equilibrium
This section starts the analysis by studying the effect of delegation on the agent’s motivation
or effort. As mentioned earlier, the key building block is that – by revealed preference
(applied to differing priors) – the agent has more confidence in his own decisions than in
those of the manager. Delegation will thus increase the agent’s confidence in the course of
which issue is relevant to this project. Letting ce, cc, and µi be drawn before the contract negotiations would
qualitatively preserve the results of the paper, but makes some results more difficult to state and interpret.
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action. When effort is a complement to making the right decision (so that effort is more
useful when the decision is correct), then such higher confidence causes the agent to put in
more effort.
I will first formalize this for the current model and then discuss how these results are af-
fected by complements versus substitutes. To state the result formally, consider the subgame
that starts in period 2, thus taking the contract (α, w), the costs cc and ce, and the belief
draws as given. Let ρi denote the belief (about any specified event) of player i at the end of
period 2. To focus the argument, I also assume that βc = 0 so that any coordination issues
are excluded. The following proposition then compares the subgame equilibrium conditional
on P delegating with the subgame equilibrium conditional on P not delegating, and shows
that effort and confidence are higher under delegation.8
Proposition 1a For any given (α, w, cc, ce, µA, µP ), both ρA(DA = S) and e are (weakly,
and for some values strictly) higher when P delegates DA than when P makes the decision
herself.
Proof : Consider first the agent’s effort decision. Note that A either observes DA (when P
decides DA in period 2a) or decides DA himself, so that he always knows DA when he chooses
e. Let Zi denote the optimal action choice according to player i. The agent exerts effort iff
αβeEA[dA] ≥ βec2e/2 or
√
2αEA[dA] ≥ ce. Since DP does not affect A’s effort choice, P will always
choose DP = ZP (in 2a or 2b, which makes no difference).
Let c =
√
2α(1− νA) and c =
√
2ανA. When ce (∈ [c, c], the choice of DA does not affect e. It
follows that P would choose DA = ZP while A would choose DA = ZA. It further follows that
ρA(DA = S) equals νA under delegation and (1− νA) when P does not delegate. The proposition
thus holds when ce (∈ [c, c].
When ce ∈ [c, c] then e = 1 iff DA = ZA. When P delegates, then A will always choose DA = ZA (so
that ρA(DA = S) = νA) and e = 1. When P does not delegate then (since she does not know ZA)
P always chooses ZP . When µA and µP are such that DA = ZA then e = 1 and ρA(DA = S) = νA
like in the delegation case, else e = 0 and ρA(DA = S) = (1− νA) which are both strictly smaller
than in the delegation case. This proves the proposition. !
Note that this result would not hold, as such, if the players had a common prior but different
signals: unless the agent has a more informative signal – which I do not assume here – the
agent realizes that his information is no better than that of his principal; with a common
prior, he will thus – in expectation – have at least as much confidence in a decision by his
principal. To see this in a different way, note that this result is essentially the same as the
overoptimism result of Van den Steen (2004b).
This result suggests that delegation should increase in the importance of effort. The
following proposition confirms that intuition.
Proposition 1b For any (α, w) and (µA, µP , βc, cc, ce), there exists a βˆ ∈ [−∞,∞] such
that P delegates iff βe ≥ βˆ.
8Technically, it is thus as if I split stage 2a in two steps: the decision to delegate and the potential choice
of DP (and DA if applicable), and then consider the effects of the delegation decision.
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Proof : Let Zi denote the action that player i considers best. The agents exerts effort iff
αβeEA[dA] ≥ βec2e/2 or
√
2αEA[dA] ≥ ce, so let again c =
√
2α(1− νA) and c =
√
2ανA. If c ≥ ce
then A always exerts effort, if c ≥ ce ≥ c then A exerts effort iff DA = ZA, and if ce ≥ c then A
never exerts effort. Since these 3 cases do not depend on βe, I can show the result case by case.
If c ≥ ce, A always exerts effort, so that P doesn’t gain from allowing DA = ZA. She will therefore
make sure that DA = DP = ZP by centralizing the decision whenever c ≥ ce (i.e., by choosing DA
in 2a). The proposition then holds for βˆ =∞.
The case with c ≤ ce is analogous but now with A never exerting effort.
If, finally, c ≥ ce ≥ c, so that A exerts effort iff DA = ZA, then P has the following choices:
a. DA = DP = ZP , but e = 0 when ZA (= ZP , so that UP = (1− α)
(
2νP − βe2 νP
)
.
b. DP = ZP , DA = ZA, and e = 1, so UP = (1− α)
(
νP +
νP +(1−νP )
2
)
.
Note that the second outcome obtains when P does not make any decisions in period 2a, so that
A follows her prior ZA. (In particular, this excludes A trying to coordinate. Other equilibria are
possible, e.g. with both players always choosing X, but are Pareto-dominated.)
In this case delegation is optimal iff case b is optimal. So I need to show that there exists a βˆ such
that case b is optimal iff βe ≥ βˆ. Some algebra shows that this is indeed true with βˆ = 2νP−1νP . !
There is something remarkable about this result : the principal delegates even though she
knows that delegation can only make the decision worse. Moreover, she would not overturn a
decision that she believes is wrong even if she could do so. In fact, instead of delegating, the
principal could also ask her employees to suggest a course of action and then rubberstamp
that decision (even if she actually believes it is wrong, which is in contrast to rubberstamping
in Aghion and Tirole (1997)’s P-formal authority model where the principal only rubber-
stamps decisions that she infers to be optimal given her information). While this may sound
a bit surprising, it is actually not at all unusual in organizations for a manager to allow her
employees to follow a course of action that she believes to be inferior but that she knows
‘fires up the troops’.
An important factor in this mechanism is – as mentioned above – the fact that effort
and correct decisions are complements in the specification of the probability of success Π:
Π has increasing differences in e and dA since
∂Π(e,dA=1)
∂e ≥ ∂Π(e,dA=0)∂e (Milgrom and Roberts
1990, Milgrom and Roberts 1994). In other words, effort is more useful when the decision
is correct than when the decision is wrong. The prototypical case of such complementarity
is the situation where effort is necessary to implement a decision. Implementing a wrong
decision is not very useful so that implementation effort on a wrong decision is more or less
wasted. Effort to implement a correct decision, on the other hand, is very useful.
The opposite case would be when effort and correct decision are substitutes, i.e., when
the inequality runs in the other way and effort is thus more useful when the decision is wrong.
It is more difficult to find clean examples of this. One situation that tends to come to mind
is a situation where effort can make up for a wrong decision, although this case turns out to
be less clear-cut than it may seem. Imagine, for example, that the project is a success if and
only if it achieves a specific level of quality, and that effort and decision quality are additive.
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In this case, there is usually a range of values where effort and decisions are substitutes, but
(importantly) there is also usually a range where they are complements.9
In the case that effort and correct decisions are substitutes, the result is exactly the
opposite: delegation will actually lead to lower effort levels by the agent. Appendix B shows
this result formally and studies the implications for delegation.
Although the issue whether decision and effort are complements or substitutes is an
empirical one, the above examples and informal observations suggest that complementary
effort is more common and more important than substitute effort. That is the reason for
focusing on that case.
I will now argue that this theory of delegation differs both in terms of predictions and in
terms of underlying mechanisms from Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Za´bojn´ık (2002).
In Aghion and Tirole (1997), agent and principal get (initially unknown) private benefits
from alternative courses of action, and can spend effort on learning these private payoffs.
The role of delegation – or A-formal authority as they also refer to it – is to give the agent
maximal returns from – and thus incentives for – collecting information, by allowing him
to choose his most preferred action. Since effort is an input to making decisions in their
model, effort and decisions are neither complements nor substitutes so that they have no
predictions regarding this distinction. Second, information collection by the principal – which
is absent from the current model – plays a crucial role in theirs: without such information
collection, delegation would not matter since the principal would anyways always follow the
agent’s advise. Third, commitment (to delegation) is essential in Aghion and Tirole (1997):
if the principal were able to overturn the agent’s decision whenever she finds out what his
optimal action is, then she would do so, and the effect of delegation would be eliminated.
In the current paper, on the contrary, the principal would not overturn the agent’s decision,
even if she could. Finally, the papers’ mechanisms are very different in the following sense:
in Aghion and Tirole (1997), the agent put in effort in order to select (in the future) an
attractive action, while here the agent put in effort because an attractive action was selected
(in the past).
In Za´bojn´ık (2002), agent and principal each get a private signal about which action
is most likely to succeed. Since ordering the agent what to do reveals the principal’s sig-
nal, delegation is necessary if the principal wants to hide her signal, and she may want to
do so when hiding her signal increases the agent’s effort. The current paper shares with
Za´bojn´ık (2002) the idea that – with complements – the agent will spend more effort if he
has more confidence in the decision and that delegation may be used to affect the agent’s
confidence. The papers, however, differ substantially in the effect and role of delegation and,
as a consequence, in their predictions. In Za´bojn´ık (2002), the agent may actually have more
confidence under centralization than under decentralization. This will, in particular, be the
case when his signal agrees with that of the principal. Since his signal is more likely to agree
than to disagree with that of the principal, it is – in Za´bojn´ık (2002) – actually more likely
9For an example, let the outcome function R be an additive function of the decision indicator d and the
effort level e, i.e., R = d+ e with d, e ∈ {0, 1}. Assume that the project is a success with payoff 1 if and only
if R ≥ R, and give payoff 0 otherwise. In this case, effort compensates for bad decisions. Note now that e
and d are substitutes when R < 1, but they are complements when R > 1.
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that the agent is more confident under centralization than under decentralization, than the
other way around. Even when taking the strength of beliefs into account, it is straight-
forward to show that the agent’s expected confidence is higher under delegation only if his
signal is stronger than that of the principal. In the current paper, on the contrary, the agent
always has more confidence in the decisions under delegation – by revealed preference – and
will thus always spend more effort in the case of complements. So while in Za´bojn´ık (2002)
delegation under complements may either increase or decrease the agent’s confidence and
effort, the current paper makes a clear prediction that effort will increase under delegation
when effort and correct decisions are complements. Za´bojn´ık (2002) also shows that delega-
tion can be optimal not only under complements but also under substitutes. The latter is
never the case in the current paper.
4 Coordination in Subgame Equilibrium
Consider now the issue of coordination. Since coordination is a special case of externalities,
two ways to deal with coordination issues come immediately to mind.10 The first is to
use incentives. The idea here is to make the agent internalize the externality he causes by
not coordinating with the other, and thus to make it in his interest to coordinate (at least
when coordination is efficient). This incentive approach plays, for example, an important
role in both Athey and Roberts (2001) and Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2005). In both
cases, the agent’s incentives will become more broad-based or more balanced as coordination
becomes more important. The second way to get coordination is by using authority. In
particular, when the principal can tell the agent what to do, then it is as if all decisions are
made by one person and thus automatically coordinated. This suggests that centralization
should increase when coordination becomes more important.
The main result of this section is that the incentive solution to coordination often doesn’t
work, or works less well, when differing priors (rather than private benefits) are the source
of the coordination problems. The reason is that giving the agent more residual income not
only makes him care more about coordination but also increases his incentives to follow his
own beliefs, even if that means losing coordination. In the model of this paper, these two
effects exactly cancel each other out so that incentives don’t work at all to solve coordination
problems. To better illuminate the role of differing priors, I contrast the differing priors
model with an analogous private benefits model and get a very different conclusion: while
residual income allocation has no effect on coordination in the differing priors model, it
always allows to achieve efficient coordination in the private benefits model. Although this
is just one comparison (though an important one), and thus does not allow us to conclude
that incentives never work with differing priors and/or always work with private benefits, the
contrast does provide some clear clues as to why residual income performs worse in solving
the coordination problem in the differing priors model than in the private benefits model.
The main implication of this analysis is that organizations have to rely more heavily on
authority to solve coordination problems when they are caused by differing priors.
10I focus here on coordination issues caused by conflicting benefits or beliefs, and thus disregard awareness,
equilibrium selection, and information issues, which are also important sources of coordination problems.
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To study this effect formally, consider the model in section 2. As in section 3, consider
the subgame starting in period 2, and assume now that βe = 0 to focus completely on
coordination. While section 3 compared the equilibrium conditional on centralization and
decentralization, I will focus here completely on the case that P decides to delegate. This
effectively eliminates authority for now, and thus allows me to study transparently what can
or cannot be achieved (in terms of coordination) by appropriately allocating residual income.
Note that if the players could contract on the actions and the income rights (and a trans-
fer) then they would always agree to coordinate. In other words, joint utility maximization
always requires coordination. Absent the ability to contract on actions, the players could try
to achieve coordination just by using incentives. In particular, they could try to allocate the
income shares so that each player internalizes his effect on the coordination cost, βccc(1−C),
in a way that makes the players coordinate. The following proposition says that this is im-
possible, as long as α is not 0 or 1. In particular, it implies that whether the players end up
coordinating or not is completely independent of the distribution of income α.
Proposition 2a The players coordinate if and only if (2νA − 1) ≤ βccc. This condition is
independent of α, as long as α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof : To get coordination, the agent must be willing to forgo his preferred course of action.
The agent, with share αA of the project revenue, is willing to do so if αA(1− νA) ≥ αA(νA − βccc)
or βccc ≥ 2νA − 1. This implies the proposition. !
To clarify what is happening, it is useful to contrast this with an analogous model with
private benefits. In particular, consider a standard private benefits model in which the
common project generates 1− βccc(1−C) (which gets distributed according to αA and αP ),
while player i also gets a private benefit Bi ≥ 0 from choosing his or her preferred action.
Each player’s preferred action is randomly and independently determined, with X and Y
being equally likely. Note that, for a given set of differing priors and for fixed αi, this private
benefits model is equivalent to the differing priors model with Bi = αi(νi− 12). The following
proposition now says that the coordination problem can always be solved by an appropriate
choice of α.11
Proposition 2b Whenever it is efficient for A to coordinate with P , there exists an α that
implements such coordination (under delegation).
Proof : Note that P , not knowing ZA, will always choose ZP (in any equilibrium that is not
Pareto-dominated). It is then efficient for A to always coordinate with P if βccc ≥ BA, which he
will do if αAβccc ≥ BA, which can always be satisfied. This proves the proposition. !
To see the intuition behind these contrasting results, consider what happens in the case
of private benefits. Each player’s action choice exerts an externality on the other player
through its impact on the project revenue. Shifting project revenue to a player has two
effects: it makes that player internalize the externality and therefore make a more efficient
choice, and it reduces the externality on the other player. An important equivalent intuition
11For the statement of the proposition, note that, given the structure of the game, A can coordinate its
action with P (by following P ’s lead when P chooses in 2a) but not the other way around.
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is that allocating more of the project revenue to a player reduces the relative importance of
his private benefits and thus makes his actions more efficient.
In the differing priors model, on the contrary and as mentioned earlier, allocating more
residual income to a player makes that player care more, not only about his miscoordination
externality, but also about the course of action he ends up taking, and these two effects
exactly cancel each other out. Another way to see this is that with differing priors, the
residual income is the embodiment of the private benefits. As a consequence, shifting residual
income simultaneously changes the corresponding private benefits. And in this case, the
change in corresponding private benefits goes exactly opposite to what the parties desire to
achieve.
While the result may seem quite trivial in the current context (although it actually holds
in much more generality), it does indicate a significant difference between differing priors
and private benefits. It also suggests that the focus of economics on private benefits may
bias conclusions in the direction of incentives, away from more direct forms of authority.
The second result of this section is that the principal will only enforce, or need to enforce,
her decisions at intermediate costs of miscoordination. The reason is that when miscoordina-
tion is very damaging to the project then the agent has independent incentives to coordinate
(if the agent somehow cares about the outcome), which then reduces the need to enforce
authority. At low levels of miscoordination costs, this independent incentive is insufficient to
cause effective coordination, so that it is necessary to enforce the principal’s decisions to get
coordination. But low levels of miscoordination costs also mean that there is little to gain
from coordination, so that the gain from enforcement is low. At the other extreme, when
miscoordination costs are very high, the incentives for autonomous coordination become
sufficient to cause effective coordination. In the differing priors model above, for example,
the players coordinated autonomously if βccc ≥ (2νA − 1). High levels of miscoordination
costs cc then reduce the need for enforcing the principal’s decisions. Overall, the need for
enforcement is thus indeed highest at intermediate levels of βccc.
To see simultaneously both results – the use of authority at high levels of βccc and the
use of enforcement at intermediate levels of βccc – consider the model of section 2 with
probability of success
Π = dA + dP − βccc(1− C)− βe(1− e)dA
where C = IDA=DP is the indicator function that DA and DP are coordinated (‘Coordinated’).
Let γc = βccc; let JˆA denote the person who optimally decides on DA from the perspective
of the principal; and let F be the indicator function that P needs to enforce her decisions
(i.e., that A would disobey P if he had the chance). The following proposition says that –
for exogenously given α – increasing γc = βccc leads to more coordination (C = 1) and less
decentralization (JˆA = P ). Enforcement of P ’s decisions (F = 1), however, is necessary
only at intermediate levels of γc. Moreover, all the cutoff levels are independent of α, which
means that incentives are completely ineffective to achieve coordination.
Proposition 3 For any (νA, νP ,α, βe, ce), there exist γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 (which may sometimes be
∞) such that
12
• C = 1 iff γc ≥ γ1
• JˆA = P iff γc ≥ γ2
• F = 1 iff γ3 ≤ γc < γ4
The γ1, γ2, γ3, and γ4 are independent of α.
Proof : As before, it will suffice to show this for each of the following (mutually exclusive,
collectively exhaustive) cases:
1. ce ≥
√
2ανA so that A never exerts effort,
2. ce ≤
√
2α(1− νA) so that A always exerts effort, and
3.
√
2ανA ≥ ce ≥
√
2α(1− νA) so that A exerts effort iff DA = ZA.
In case 1 (where e = 0), P will always make sure that DA = ZP and C = 1, so that γ1 = 0 and
γ2 = 0. Enforcement will be necessary (F = 1) if (and only if) A prefers ZA rather than ZP , which
is when (1 − βe)νA − βccc ≥ (1 − βe)(1 − νA) or (1 − βe)(2νA − 1) ≥ βccc so that γ3 = 0 and
γ4 = (1− βe)(2νA − 1). Case 2 (where e = 1) is completely analogous, except that γ4 = 2νA − 1.
Consider now case 3 (where e = 1 iff DA = ZA). The principal has the following choices:
a. DA = DP = ZP , but e = 0 when ZA (= ZP : UP = (1− α)(2− βe2 )νP
b. DP = ZP , DA = ZA, and e = 1: UP = (1− α)(νP + νP +(1−νP )−βccc2 ) = (1− α)(νP + 1−γc2 ).
where the second case obtains when P does not make any decisions in period 2a. (Other equilibria
are again Pareto-dominated.) Note that case 3a dominates case 3b if and only if (2 − βe2 )νP ≥
(νP + 1−γc2 ) or γc ≥ 1 − (2 − βe)νP = βeνP − (2νP − 1) = γ˜. With respect to enforcement within
case 3a, note that A strictly prefers ZA iff
α((1− νA) + νA − γc)− βec2e/2 > α((1− νA) + (1− βe)(1− νA))
or γc < γˆ = 2νA − 1 + βe(1− νA)− βec
2
e
2α so that enforcement is necessary in case 3a only if γc < γˆ.
To finish the proof for case 3, note that if βe ≤ (2νP−1)νP then γ˜ ≤ 0 and 3a dominates 3b, so that
γ1 = γ2 = 0. Moreover, γ3 = 0 and γ4 = γˆ. If
(2νP−1)
νP
≤ βe, then 3a dominates 3b iff γc ≥ γ˜ ≥ 0,
so γ1 = γ2 = γ˜. Enforcement is needed iff γc ∈ [min(γ˜, γˆ), γˆ). This proves the proposition. !
While this result says that no enforcement of authority will be necessary when coordination
is very important (since the players will self-coordinate), there are a few important caveats
to this result. First of all, it does assume and require that the players all care about the
overall project outcome. Second, the players have to find a way to coordinate on the same
action, which is non-trivial since there are typically multiple equilibria. In the model, the
latter issue was absent since the principal chose first. The absence of such sequencing would
make coordination more difficult. Finally, when coordination does happen, the principal will
want to make sure that they coordinate on the action that she believes is best. If she cannot
impose this through choosing first, then she has even more reasons to enforce her decisions.
This requires further research.
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5 Putting it all together: Coordination versus Motiva-
tion
From an organization design perspective, one of the key implications of the preceding analysis
is that the need to allocate authority induces a trade-off between motivation and coordina-
tion. In particular, in the typical case that effort and decisions are complements, centralized
decision-making gives strong coordination but weak motivation, while decentralized decision-
making gives weak coordination but strong motivation. Assigning decision rights thus forces
a choice between motivation and coordination.
One way to think about this trade-off is in terms of a motivation-coordination ‘possibility
frontier’ (Roberts 2004). Such possibility frontier shows the maximum degree of coordination
as a function of the desired level of motivation for a given amount of resources spent. A
down-sloping possibility frontier indicates a trade-off between motivation and coordination.
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Figure 2: The within-firm tradeoff between motivation and coordination. νA = .9,α = .2
For the model of section 2, the possibility frontier can be derived directly from the analysis
of the preceding sections. In particular, in the context of that model, the frontier captures
the maximum probability of coordination as a function of the desired probability of agent-
effort, for a given level of agent-incentives α. One such frontier for the model is represented
in figure 2. Note that, since the frontier just represents possibilities without reference to their
relative benefits, this graph is independent of the importance of effort or coordination. The
relationship of this frontier to the equilibrium outcome is as follows. For a given frontier, i.e.,
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for a given α, the principal essentially picks a motivation-coordination point on the frontier
(by his choice of delegation). The choice of α in the first stage determines from which frontier
the principal can choose. Note also that I define the ‘probability of coordination’ here to be
the probability that the principal’s actions are such that there will always be coordination.12
The fact that the possibility frontier is downward sloping can be derived formally. Let the
function Pc(Pe) denote the maximum probability of coordination if the desired probability
of effort is Pe. The following proposition essentially combines the earlier delegation and
coordination results.
Proposition 4 For any (νA, νP ,α, w), Pc(Pe) decreases in Pe.
Proof : Remember that
1. If ce ≤
√
2α(1− νA) then A will always exert effort, and P can always ensure coordination.
2. If ce ≥
√
2ανA then A will never exert effort, so P can again always ensure coordination
without affecting effort.
3. If
√
2α(1− νA) ≤ ce ≤
√
2ανA then A will exert effort if and only if DA = ZA. By ran-
domizing between ZA and ZP , P can choose any probability of coordination Pc. But the
probability of effort will necessarily be Pe = 1− Pc.
Consider first the case that
√
2α(1− νA) < 1. For Pe ≤
√
2α(1− νA), we then have Pc = 1.
For
√
2α(1− νA) < Pe ≤ min(
√
2ανA, 1), Pc will be a strictly decreasing function with slope −1.
For Pe >
√
2ανA, Pc drops to zero, since these values of Pe are impossible. In the case that√
2α(1− νA) ≥ 1, the Pc = 1 for all values of Pe. This concludes the proposition. !
This perspective on the motivation-coordination trade-off focuses on within-firm compar-
isons. A different way to think about the trade-off is to look at a population of firms and see
whether motivation and coordination are negatively correlated across firms. The following
proposition does that, and more. It shows that in firms where effort is more important
and/or coordination is less important, delegation will be high, effort will be high, and co-
ordination will be low, and vice versa. It also shows that, as a consequence, there will be
a negative tradeoff between effort and coordination in the population. Let Pd, Pc and Pe
denote respectively the equilibrium probability of delegation, coordination, and effort.
Proposition 5 For any νA, νP ,
• Pd increases in βe and decreases in βc
• Pc decreases in βe and increases in βc,
• Pe decreases in βc and increases in βe,
12When the principal delegates, the parties will obviously also happen to coordinate from time to time, but
this is pure coincidence rather than on purpose. Using the wider definition of ‘probability of coordination’
to be the probability that there happens to be ex-post coordination, simply requires a transformation of
variable that preserves all results and graphs (up to the rescaling).
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• For a given βe and for βc ∼ F for any F with suppF ⊂ [0, 1− βe], Pc decreases in Pe.
For a given βc and for βe ∼ F for any F with suppF ⊂ [0, 1− βc], Pc decreases in Pe.
For βe = k − βc, with k ∈ [ 0, 1 ], and βc ∼ F ,with suppF ⊂ [0, k], Pc decreases in Pe.
Proof : The proof is in appendix. !
Figure 3 represents this graphically. In particular, it depicts the probabilities of effort and co-
ordination for 20,000 ‘firms’ for which (βe, βc) were randomly drawn from the [(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)]
triangle. Note that this is now not a possibility frontier any more, but an equilibrium out-
come. It is clear that there is a strong trade-off between motivation and coordination across
firms.13
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Figure 3: The across-firms tradeoff between motivation and coordination. νA = νP = .9, n =
20, 000. For 20,000 firms, the (βe,βc) were randomly drawn. The graph represents the probabilities
of coordination and effort for each of these firms.
13This can potentially also be interpreted as within-firm comparisons: we could imagine that a firm is
faced with 20,000 projects that each have a different weight on motivation and coordination (i.e., different
βe and βc). The data then represent the motivation/coordination equilibrium outcomes for each of these
project. However, the ‘across-firm’ interpretation seems to fit better.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Additional Effects of Differing Priors on Motivation and Co-
ordination
An important simplifying assumption in this paper is that the principal can simply choose
whether to centralize or decentralize the decision DA, at no cost. However, nearly any
decision must get executed by an agent, who can – at least in principle – choose not to
follow the (centralized) decision. In some cases, this issue is of little concern since the agents
have no reason to deviate from the centralized decision and since the principal has simple
means for enforcing her decision. When, for example, a dean raises a faculty’s salary, the
school’s administrative staff is unlikely to refuse to implement that decision. If so, we can
simply assume that decision rights get allocated by contract or by fiat. In important other
cases, however, an agent may have reasons to disobey the principal and enforcing obedience
may then be more problematic. When the same dean decides how his faculty should teach
their classes, he may have a much more difficult time enforcing obedience. In that case,
ensuring centralization may be costly and may have important implications in and of itself.
Van den Steen (2005b) shows how this issue of compliance may introduce an additional
effect to motivation-coordination trade-off. In particular, strong incentives may give the
agent more reason to disobey his principal’s orders when the two of them disagree on the
right course of action. This strengthens obviously the trade-off between motivation and co-
ordination: to get the agent to exert more effort, the principal needs to give more incentives,
but this reduces his control over the agent and thus reduces the coordination that is possible.
There is one further effect of differing priors that indirectly affects the trade-off between
motivation and coordination. Van den Steen (2006) shows that shifting the residual income
to one person makes it efficient to also allocate more control rights to that person, and
vice versa. This is due to a combination of two effects. On the one hand, shifting control
rights to a person makes that person value the income rights higher, by revealed preference.
On the other hand, shifting income rights to a person makes that person value the control
rights higher, since they affect his utility more.14 This co-location of authority and income
rights implies that giving a person incentives (to increase effort) will make it more attractive
to also delegate that person more decision rights, but that will lead to less coordination.
Although the effect is indirect, it is another force in the motivation-coordination tradeoff.
The assumption of limited liability for the agent eliminated this effect from the analysis.
6.2 Is the trade-off unavoidable?
Given the importance of this trade-off, does the theory suggest any way to get around it?
And if the theory does suggest such a way, why don’t all firms use it, and so why would we
14As Van den Steen (2006) shows, this intuitive mechanism requires differing priors and does not hold in
an analogous model with common priors but private benefits. First, with common priors all players value
an income stream identically, which eliminates the first effect. Second, private benefits and residual income
from a project may require conflicting decisions, in which case a player may value control less when his
private benefits become more important.
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still observe the tradeoff?
The theory actually does suggest how to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the trade-off: hire
agents who agree with the principal. Increasing the degree of agreement between principal
and agent has a double effect. On the one hand, the agent will be more motivated when
decisions are centralized since he often agrees with the principal’s decision and thus expects a
high return on his effort. On the other hand, delegation leads to fewer coordination problems
since the agent will often choose the same course of action as the principal.
The idea that a high degree of homogeneity allows to combine high coordination with
strong motivation is in line with some of the ideas in the management literature. In par-
ticular, ‘corporate culture’ has often been interpreted as shared beliefs or shared values
(Schein 1985, Van den Steen 2005a) and the ability to motivate people in a coordinated way
has been mentioned as one of its important advantages (Kotter and Heskett 1992).
So why wouldn’t all firms do this? The answer to this question is two-sided. On the
one hand, firms definitely do this, to some degree. In particular, firms sort explicitly in
their hiring process for employees who ‘fit’, and fit is in part about the employees’ beliefs
and values. Employees also self-sort: employees who get forced to follow a course of action
that they believe will lead to failure may simply quit when they care about the outcome.
Both sorting and self-sorting, however, are difficult and expensive. Self-sorting is in essence
turnover, which causes an immediate destruction of firm specific human capital and of orga-
nizational capital. Sorting by the firm is hindered by the fact that many beliefs are implicit
and moreover easy to misrepresent. Finally, shared beliefs and values also have negative
effects, e.g. by reducing the incentives to collect information or to communicate (Landier,
Sraer, and Thesmar 2006, Van den Steen 2004a).
Overall, only firms who really need simultaneously high levels of coordination and high
levels of motivation, and who can live with the downsides of homogeneity, should follow this
path. As a consequence, the trade-off will remain even though solutions are available.
7 Comparison to other papers on the motivation vs. co-
ordination trade-off
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two other papers that deal (directly or indirectly)
with the motivation-coordination trade-off.
To my knowledge, the first formal economics paper on the trade-off between motivation
and coordination is Athey and Roberts (2001), who study the conflict between effort and
correct decisions in the presence of externalities, which includes coordination as a special
case. Their argument is as follows. Imagine a situation where an agent has to spend effort
that increases his own output, but the agent also has to make a decision that affects both
his own output and that of others. If the firm wants to raise the agent’s effort, it needs
to increase the pay-for-performance on the agent’s own output. However, in order to get
optimal decisions in the presence of externalities, equal weight should be put on all the
output-components that are affected by that decision, i.e., incentives should be balanced.
Ideally the firm would thus also want to raise the agent’s pay-for-performance on the others’
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output. But doing so is costly since it exposes the agent to more risk. As a consequence,
increasing effort will in equilibrium lead to more distorted decisions.
Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2005) study how organizing a firm along functional or
product lines affects the implementation of synergies, which again includes coordination as
a special case. The central result (from the perspective of the current paper) is again that
coordination requires balanced incentives, and thus reduces effort, with the cost of giving
incentives now coming from the budget balance constraint. In their paper, however, there
are two mechanisms that drive the need for balanced incentives. While the first mechanism
is similar to that in Athey and Roberts (2001), they also have the interesting new result that
raising pay-for-performance on the agent’s own output will reduce communication about po-
tential externalities. This communication effect thus introduces a second important trade-off.
Finally, their analysis also shows that changing decision structures without simultaneously
changing incentives may be futile, and illustrate that point with applications.
Both these papers are very different from the current one. One key distinction is that
in both Athey and Roberts (2001) and Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2005), the alloca-
tion of control has no direct effect (other than through the intensity of incentives) on the
agent’s effort or motivation. In other words, after controlling for incentives, delegation does
not play a role in the agent’s motivation and the trade-off disappears. This distinguishes
these two models from this paper’s both in terms of mechanisms and in terms of empiri-
cal implications. With respect to coordination, both papers rely to a large extent on the
externality-internalizing effects of residual income, which I show explicitly to be completely
ineffective in this paper. Furthermore, there are also obvious differences in the underlying
mechanisms such as the role of private information versus differing priors.
8 Conclusion
This paper studied how open disagreement affects the delegation/centralization decision
when the firm cares about both motivation and coordination. I first derived a new rationale
for delegation: delegation increases motivation when effort and correct decisions are comple-
ments since the agent thinks that his own decisions are better than those of the principal. A
need for implementation effort will thus lead to more decentralization. The opposite is true
when effort and decisions are substitutes.
I then turned to coordination and showed that coordination problems caused by differing
priors require more reliance on authority (as opposed to incentives) than coordination prob-
lems caused by private benefits. The reason here is that while incentives make the agent
care more about coordination, that effect gets counter-acted by the fact that incentives give
the agent more reasons to follow his own beliefs. In this paper, these two effects exactly
cancelled each other out. I also showed that the principal will (need to) enforce her decisions
only at intermediate levels of the need for coordination.
The combination of these results implied a trade-off between motivation and coordination.
This trade-off is one of the key challenges in organization design.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5: Remember the cases 1, 2, 3a, and 3b of the proof of proposition 3. Let
γ˜ again be such that 3a dominates 3b iff γc ≥ γ˜, let c˜ = γ˜βc or
c˜ =
1− (2− βe)νP
βc
=
1− 2νP + βeνP
βc
and let cˇ be its restriction to [ 0, 1 ], i.e., cˇ = max(0,min(1, c˜)). We then have that
Pd =
(√
2ανA −
√
2α(1− νA)
)
cˇ =
√
2α
(√
νA −
√
(1− νA)
)
cˇ
Pc = 1− Pd
Pe =
√
2α(1− νA) +
(√
2ανA −
√
2α(1− νA)
)
cˇ =
√
2α
(√
(1− νA) +
(√
νA −
√
(1− νA)
)
cˇ
)
For the first 3 parts of the proposition, it thus suffices to show that α and cˇ both increase in βe
and decrease in βc. For cˇ, this is trivial. For α, define
Y =
∫ cˇ
0
(νP +
1
2
− βcv
2
) dv +
∫ 1
cˇ
(
2− βe
2
)
νP dv
so that
UP = (1− α)
{√
2α(1− νA)2νP + (1−
√
2ανA)(2− βe)νP +
(√
2ανA −
√
2α(1− νA)
)
Y
}
= (1− α)(2− βe)νP + (1− α)
√
2α
(√
(1− νA)2νP −√νA(2− βe)νP +
(√
νA −
√
(1− νA)
)
Y
)
Note that dYdβe = −νP2 (1− cˇ) and dYdβc = − cˇ
2
4 . Note further that
dUP
dα
= −(2− βe)νP + 1− 3α√
2α
(√
(1− νA)2νP −√νA(2− βe)νP +
(√
νA −
√
(1− νA)
)
Y
)
so that at the optimum α < 13 (where I use the fact that 2νP ≥ Y ≥ (2 − βe)νP to sign the last
factor of the derivative above). It also follows that
∂2UP
∂α∂βe
= νP +
1− 3α√
2α
(√
νAνP +
(√
νA −
√
(1− νA)
)(
−νP
2
(1− cˇ)
))
= νP +
1− 3α√
2α
(√
νA
(
νP − νP2 (1− cˇ)
)
+
√
(1− νA)νP2 (1− cˇ)
)
> 0
and further
∂2UP
∂α∂βc
=
1− 3α√
2α
(√
νA −
√
(1− νA)
)(
− cˇ
2
4
)
< 0
The last part of the proof follows directly. !
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B The Effect of Complements versus Substitutes
This appendix considers the effect of complements versus substitutes on the delegation mechanism.
As I mentioned before, delegation will increase the agent’s effort if and only if effort is a complement
to the decision.
To obtain this results formally, I start from the model of section 2, but consider the subgame
starting in period 1d. In other words, I take α, w, ce, and cc as exogenously given. Also, in order
to capture both substitutes and complements and to keep the analysis maximally transparent, I
will consider variations on the specification of section 2 for the probability of success (and project
return) Π.
Let me first formally show the intuition that effort will be higher under delegation if and only
if effort and decisions are complements. This result is actually demonstrated most transparently
by simplifying the specification to a probability of success Π that is increasing in e and dA, which
includes the specification of section 2. Let JA ∈ {A,P} denote the identity of the player who
decides on decision DA, and let eˆ denote the agent’s choice of effort. The following proposition
then captures formally the result that effort will be higher under delegation if effort and decisions
are complements, and lower if they are substitutes.
Proposition 1 If ∂Π(e,dA=1)∂e ≥ ∂Π(e,dA=0)∂e ∀e, then eˆ(JA = A) ≥ eˆ(JA = P ). If, on the contrary,
∂Π(e,dA=1)
∂e ≤ ∂Π(e,dA=0)∂e ∀e, then eˆ(JA = A) ≤ eˆ(JA = P ).
Proof : Let αi denote the share of project revenue that goes to player i, let Zi = argmaxDA∈{X,Y } Ei[αiΠ(e, dA)]
denote the best action according to player i, and let Qi,j = Ei[dA | DA = Zj ] denote i’s estimate of
the probability that j is right. By revealed preference QA,A ≥ QA,P , or QA,A − QA,P ≥ 0. If now
∂Π(e,dA=1)
∂e ≥ ∂Π(e,dA=0)∂e ∀e, then
(QA,A −QA,P )∂Π(e, 1)
∂e
≥ (QA,A −QA,P )∂Π(e, 0)
∂e
or
QA,A
∂Π(e, 1)
∂e
+ (1−QA,A)∂Π(e, 0)
∂e
≥ QA,P ∂Π(e, 1)
∂e
+ (1−QA,P )∂Π(e, 0)
∂e
or
∂
∂e
EA[Π(e, dA) | DA = ZA] ≥ ∂
∂e
EA[Π(e, dA) | DA = ZP ]
or, with G(e, j) = jEA[αΠ(e, dA) | DA = ZA] + (1− j)EA[αΠ(e, dA) | DA = ZP ],
∂2G(e, j)
∂e∂j
≥ 0
At the same time, using notation c(e) = βecee,
eˆ(JA = A) = argmax
e∈{0,1}
EA[αΠ(e, dA)− c(e) | DA = ZA] = argmax
e∈{0,1}
G(e, 1)− c(e)
while
eˆ(JA = P ) = argmax
e∈{0,1}
EA[αΠ(e, dA)− c(e) | DA = ZP ] = argmax
e∈{0,1}
G(e, 0)− c(e)
The proof of the first part then follows by monotone comparative statics. The second part is analogous. !
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This result suggests straightforward implications for delegation and centralization: when effort and
decisions are complements, delegation should increase in the importance of effort, while the opposite
is true when effort and decisions are substitutes. To study that issue, consider the following slight
elaboration of the specification in section 2:
Π(γ) = dA + dP − βccc(1− C)− βe[γ(1− e)dA + (1− γ)e(dA − 1)]
for γ ∈ [ 0, 1 ], which equals the original specification when γ = 1. Note that effort and the decision
are complements if and only if γ ≥ 1/2 and they are substitutes if and only if γ ≤ 1/2. The
following proposition then confirms the result that an increase in the importance of effort leads to
more delegation if effort and decisions are complements but not so if they are substitutes. Let JˆA
denote the person who optimally decides on DA from the perspective of the principal.
Proposition 2 When γ > 1/2, then there exists (for any (νA, νP ,βc, cc, ce) and (α, w)) a βˆ such
that JˆA = A if βe ≥ βˆ, and JˆA = P otherwise. If γ < 1/2, JˆA = P for any set of parameters.
Proof : Let Zi denote the action that player i considers best. Note that A exerts effort iff αβe[γEA[dA]+(1−
γ)(1−EA[dA])] ≥ βec2e/2 or
√
2α[(1− γ) + (2γ − 1)EA[dA]] ≥ ce. Let c =
√
2α[(1− γ) + (2γ − 1)(1− νA)]
and c =
√
2α[(1− γ) + (2γ − 1)νA].
Consider first the case that γ > 1/2. If c ≥ ce then A will always exert effort, if c ≥ ce ≥ c then A will exert
effort iff DA = ZA, and if ce ≥ c then A will never exert effort. Since these 3 cases do not depend on βe, I
can show the result case by case.
If c ≥ ce, so that A always exerts effort, then P doesn’t gain from allowing DA = ZA and will therefore
make sure that DA = DP = ZP , so that JˆA = P for any set of parameters such that c ≥ ce.
If c ≤ ce, so that A never exerts effort, P again doesn’t gain from allowing DA = ZA, so that she will make
sure that DA = DP = ZP , so that JˆA = P for any set of parameters such that c ≤ ce.
If, finally, c ≥ ce ≥ c, so that A exerts effort iff DA = ZA, then P has the following choices:
1. DA = DP = ZP , but e = 0 when ZA (= ZP , so that UP = (1−α)
(
2νP − βe2 (γνP + (1− γ)(νP − 1))
)
.
2. DP = ZP , DA = ZA, and e = 1, so UP = (1−α)
(
νP + νP+(1−νP )2 − βccc2 − βe(1− γ)(νP+(1−νP )2 − 1)
)
.
Note that in this case JˆA = A if and only if case 2 is optimal. So I need to show that there exists a βˆ such
that case 2 is optimal iff βe ≥ βˆ. Some algebra shows that this is indeed true with βˆ = βccc+2νP−1νP .
Consider now the case that γ < 1/2. A will exert effort iff
√
2α[(1− γ)− (1− 2γ)EA[dA]] ≥ ce. It follows
that if
√
2α[(1− γ)− (1− 2γ)νA ≥ ce then A will always exert effort, if
√
2α[(1− γ)− (1− 2γ)(1− νA) ≥
ce ≥
√
2α[(1− γ)− (1− 2γ)νA then A will exert effort iffDA = ZP , and if ce ≥
√
2α[(1− γ)− (1− 2γ)(1− νA)
then A will never exert effort. It follows further that P will always make sure that DA = ZP so that JˆA = P
for all parameters. !
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